Innocent
Frauds in Democracy
The
Primacy Question: Party or Parliamentarians?
Prof N Balasubramanian
________________________________________
A country’s citizens do often nurture an apparently
legitimate aspiration that since they elect their representatives to the
parliament or state legislatures or even municipal corporations, they have a
right to call them to account for their behavior and performance in the House.
In fact, there is an increasing demand from civil society that the citizens
should also have a right to recall should they feel their representative was
not representing their interests and not keeping any pre-poll promises he or she
may have made. In theory, this is perfectly valid since, following an
agent-principal approach, the masters (people) could always ask their agents
(parliamentarians) to do whatever they (as expressed by a majority) wish them
to do – either represent or resign. But there are some conceptual issues that
need sorting out before this salutary best-practice could be brought in through
electoral reforms. These can broadly be
categorised under two headings: issues relating to the representative credentials
of the parliamentarians; and those concerning the interdependencies between parliamentarians
and their parties (where they belong to one). Some possible solutions for
consideration and discussion on how to overcome some of these hurdles are also
proffered.
On the “Representative”
Credentials of Parliamentarians
A simple process of arithmetic is all that is required to
dispute the claim that elected parliamentarians are truly representative of
their electorate. Out of the country’s total population, those eligible to vote
under our adult franchise system constitute roughly fifty percent, allowing for
exclusions on account largely of the qualifying age of eighteen. Of those
eligible to vote, not all do; the median voter turnout is placed in the range
of between forty and sixty percent. For our calculation, let’s settle on 50%.
That works out at best to 25% of the people of the country the parliamentarians
could in the aggregate represent. Thanks to our fragmented party formations, compounded
by the proliferation of “regional” parties and independents (what are they
independent of is a question mark!), experience shows that no more than thirty
to forty percent of polled votes are required to win an election. This
translates to something like 7.5% to 10.0% of the constituency’s population to
be elected as its representative. So much for the representative character of
our elected parliamentarians and legislators!
How do we correct this anomalous situation? Several options
have been suggested: first, make voting mandatory – but the problem is how do
we handle hundreds of thousands who may yet not go out to vote for whatever reason: old age,
sickness, outstation, fear, and so on; second, changeover to proportional
representation, a single transferable vote system where the votes polled by the
least-polling candidate is transferred to another based on voter’s preference
iteratively till a winning candidate gets all the votes where he or she has
been preferred second, third and so on – the problem here is several fold:
given the too numerous candidates standing for election in most constituencies,
the transfer process will be excruciatingly slow and cumbersome, but even more
importantly, in a land of widespread illiteracy where candidates have to be
allotted unique symbols for illiterate people to identify them, implementing a
reasonably fool-proof system of getting the voters not only to put a stamp on
just one candidate of their choice but also to mark their preferences in
descending order on other symbols as well will be a herculean, if not virtually
impossible task; and third, penalise people failing to vote without sufficient
cause rather than mandate compulsory voting,
through measures such as denying or delaying issue of passports, driving
licences, reservation privileges, grant
of industrial licenses and subsidies, and such other actions, establishing a
more concrete linkage between a citizen’s rights and obligations.
Concomitantly, there is a pressing need to ensure that
“wrong” people do not get elected even if in the process some “right”
candidates also suffer the consequences. For example, every voter must have an
option of rejecting all the candidates in an election if none of them measure
up to the expectations. Not only this, but if 50% or more of the votes polled
favour such rejection, that particular election should be declared void and a
reelection ordered, with the provision that none of the candidates in the
impugned election would be eligible to stand again from that or any other
constituency in India for a period of five years equivalent to the full term of
an elected representative. This might at first sight seem harsh and also an
expensive proposition but the benefits should far outweigh such reservations.
In due course, it would also ensure a movement towards better discipline among
intending parliamentarians to establish a credible base and a measure of
political acceptability in their constituency, and discourage bogus and dummy
candidates often fielded with ulterior motives of dividing the votes and so on.
On Parties and Persons
The second issue in
elections is the question of which is the entity that people are asked to
elect. Candidates (except independents) belong to parties and are associated
with the policies propounded by the party manifestoes or poll promises. It is
not unusual that right people are in wrong parties and right parties field
wrong persons as their candidates. In such cases how should the voter decide to
cast his or her vote? This issue becomes even more relevant when we talk about
“recalling” an elected member midway through his or her term. Once a candidate
is elected on a party platform, he or she is virtually a bonded slave to the
party leadership in terms of policy decisions. Such a parliamentarian becomes a
non-entity and only counts a one vote in case of a division in parliament. The
notorious institution of “whip” which undoubtedly suits the party bosses
ensures that the member votes in line with the party position on pain of
disciplinary action. Even if the member wishes to represent a differing view
(hopefully representative of the general feeling in his constituency) he or she
cannot possibly go against the party whip. This unenviable position came to the
fore in recent controversies on the Jan Lokpal draft legislation when some of
the ministers in the negotiating team had to hold the party line even though
their constituents appeared to hold a different view.
Party Primacy
The moot question is whether a voter is electing a candidate
or electing a party. If the party is supreme and the persons elected at such
expense and effort are only dummies once they reach the legislature, it may be
reasonable to argue whether it would not be better to elect parties based on
their poll platforms and prospectuses rather than individuals however qualified
they might be. In this scenario, the voters would be asked to choose a party of
their preference, one for the Centre and one for the state, and the party
getting the highest number of votes would be entitled to a seat from that
constituency in the legislature. And in the aggregate, the party winning the
largest number of such constituency seats will be entitled to form the
government at the Centre or the state. The party will then appoint its council
of executive ministers and the other parties would depending upon their seats
nominate people to represent their party. Each party can be asked to nominate a
small council of no more than say three of their nominees in each constituency
to act as a bridge between the government and the people.
Does this sound a reasonable alternative to the present day
situation? On the positive side, gone will be the wasted time effort and money
on “selecting” candidates, electioneering individually (consider the air trips
of top leaders to support candidates at various locations, just as an
example!), the expensive (and eventually meaningless debates in parliament and
state legislatures), the costs of thousands of parliamentarians’ personal
establishments (including housing,
security personnel and administrative staff), elimination or at least
considerable diminution of thousands of power centres of influence and
potential corruption in the country,
and of course the frustrating time delays in getting things done at the
government level. (I am tempted to call this “reengineering” government in a
manner that may benefit more efficient and effective governance!).
On the negative side, one would lose the charms of oratory
excellence one often witnesses in such debates, and for which the “mother of
parliaments” was and is so famous. But unlike the Westminster and Capitol Hill
models with an essentially two party scenario and a comprehensive structure of
primaries and so on, India is struggling with far too many parties, most of
which are region or personality centric, and voting population that, largely
being poor and illiterate, is still grappling with problems of maturation as a
democratic nation. There are of course significant signs of inherent wisdom in
the Indian electorate as demonstrated several times and in several instances,
toppling great names and resurrecting older greats from time to time. But once
parliamentarians are elected, however inadequately or unrepresentatively, the
people who supposedly chose them cease to have any power of control over their
actions or inactions in the present dispensation; and that is a tragedy which
tends to materially impair the potency of our democratic institutions.
But this package of reforms is fraught with considerable
danger to democracy itself unless it is concurrently circumscribed by several
disciplinary rules. A short list would include:
ü Very strict rules of governance will
have to be prescribed and enforced to ensure inner party democracy; an
organization which cannot meet democratic principles internally can hardly be
trusted to respect or deliver on such requirements at a government level
ü There should be complete transparency,
accounting and disclosure/reporting on matters relating to funding, membership,
conflicted interests, and so on
ü Each national or regional party
should be required to disclose their choice of core members of the cabinet (not
exceeding fifteen in case of the Centre and ten in case of a state) with
disclosures as to their education, experience, expertise, public service,
immediate family members and complete details of their and their immediate families’
wealth and sources of income, and details of any litigation – civil or criminal
– whether closed or continuing, whether under inquiry or prosecution. Any
material change in any of these details should be dynamically disclosed as they
happen until the end of the term of the legislature, whether they happen to be
in government or in opposition
ü No member of the government or members
of parliament representing other parties in parliament or state legislatures
should be allowed to be in business or professional occupations during their
term of office. They should devote their full, or substantially full time to
the affairs of the state and their political parties, the latter in
non-executive capacities. They should not associate with any other organization
or entity (such as sports bodies and other social and apparently not-for-profit
organisations as many politicians do at present) during their tenure of office
in government or parliament. They should be adequately and attractively compensated
by the government at disclosed rates and their compensation and other terms
should be periodically reviewed and decided upon by a collegium of constitutional
authorities
ü If there are any conflicts of
interest in respect of ministers’ and parliament nominees’ family members, they
should be disclosed and the persons concerned should abstain from participation
and voting on such matters, nor should they have access to policy papers
relating to such issues
ü The bureaucracy should take oaths of
allegiance to the Constitution and should be open to disciplinary and judicial
action in case of failure to act in the best interests of the country; there is
no point in having an expensive administrative machinery if they do not apply
their minds and simply follow instructions of the ministers or party
functionaries for the time being in power.
ü There should be a well-publicised Code
of Conduct in Public Life that parliamentarians in government and opposition as
well as bureaucracy must buy into and sign off on. Any complaints of deviation
or breach should be open to investigation and reporting by a duly empowered
Lokpal and actioned subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court
ü To qualify as a national party, the
party should have secured majority votes/seats in the preceding general election
in at least one of the states (other than Union Territories) in at least three
out of the five (north, east, south, west and central) regions; in case of new
national parties, the party should have been incorporated at least two years
before the general elections, conformed to all the governance requirements prescribed
for older parties, and willing to field candidates for at least two thirds of
the constituencies in their chosen states (other than Union Territories) in at
least three regions of the country.
ü Similarly, to qualify as a regional
party, the party should have secured majority votes/seats in the preceding general
election in at least one fourth of the constituencies in at least one of the states
in any of the five (north, east, south, west and central) regions; in case of
new regional parties, the party should have been incorporated at least two
years before the general elections, conformed to all the governance
requirements prescribed for older parties, and willing to field candidates for
at least two thirds of the constituencies in their chosen states or Union
Territories
Person Primacy
If
these changes ushering in party primacy are considered too radical or
impractical at this stage and one would rather stick to the concept of person
primacy, how can we strengthen the present dispensation to make it a more
potent instrument for reflecting peoples’ views and aspirations on a continuing
basis? Here is some food for thought:
ü Focus on the individual candidate
rather than the party to which he or she belongs. Discontinue the party symbols
in ballot papers and instead allot symbols (still necessary to overcome
illiteracy related issues) to individuals
ü Apply all criteria relating to
disclosure of candidate information as set out earlier
ü Ask each candidate to issue a
pre-poll prospectus (which may be the same for all candidates belonging to a
political party) setting out what his or her charter would be if elected.
Definitely avoid any party affiliations or symbols linking the individual to
any party.
ü Ask each candidate to disclose his
party affiliation in terms of his prospectuses which he or she cannot modify
during tenure of office on pain of losing his or her seat
ü Institute all the reforms regarding
options for rejecting all candidates etc., discussed earlier
ü To ensure more meaningful reflection
of representation, prescribe two thirds of the votes polled as the criteria for
winning an election
ü To avoid frivolous candidates,
prescribe a cooling off-building up period equal to one full term of five years
for those failing to get at least ten percent of the votes polled in a
constituency, during which the candidate may not contest an election from any
constituency anywhere in the country
ü Once declared elected, the candidate
should be barred from joining or crossing over to any other formation or party
in the legislature unless such movement in concert is based on pre-poll
agreements between the parties and is fully disclosed to the electorate. Any
post-poll changes in affiliation violates then basis of winning the election
and should be declared void and the parliamentarian should forfeit his or her
seat. As a further measure of restraint, such candidates should also be disqualified from contesting in
any election for a full term of five years
ü Abolish (with limited exceptions) the
“Whip” system in parliament and state legislatures. There should be no
restraint on individual members who are representatives of the people of different
constituencies to vote on motions according to their conviction in line with
the promises they made to the people at the time of election. The exceptions to
this general principle should cover matters relating to national security,
foreign affairs, defence and armed forces, fiscal matters including budgets,
and such other subjects of national priority and importance
ü Abolish post-poll coalitions among
parties to form governments since such arrangements do not have the sanction of
the people who elected them on the basis of their prospectuses.
ü Abolish Common Minimum Programmes and
such other acts of convenience and political expediency since they involve
dropping some of the promises made to the people which formed the basis of the
election. People have not delegated the right to their elected representatives
to alter the charter on which they were elected without first getting back to
them for a reconfirmation
ü In addition to broad policy issues
covered by party prospectuses, each candidate at a personal level should commit
to the constituency in his or her pre-poll promises what he or she would do for
the constituency if elected. Failure to fulfill such promises should be
sufficient cause for disqualification in subsequent elections
